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1 Introduction
There have been various calls for fiscal policies to foster the economic stance
in the periphery countries of the European Union. These quests have high-
lighted the need to gain a better understanding of the actual effects of inter-
regional fiscal transfers in an economic union which consists of regions that
are characterized by heterogeneities with respect to productivity, technol-
ogy, skill endowments, and still considerably large differences in per-capita
income as well as population size.
In this paper we employ a two-region agent-based macroeconomic model
(Eurace@Unibi) to study the effects of a set of fiscal policies, taking into ac-
count the feedback between technological evolution in a region and (global)
competitiveness of local producers as well as the resulting (fiscal) revenues.
In the default setting fiscal policy is regional and policymakers finance trans-
fers to households and unemployment payments through taxes on household
income and firm profit in their region only. Due to the endogeneity of firms’
investment and technology choice the model dynamics in this default setting
exhibit a widening of the initial gap between the regions leaving firms in the
small region at a persistent competitive disadvantage. The mal-performing
economy in the small region implies that the government of that region runs
persistent deficits and eventually has no longer access to credit. In the ab-
sence of fiscal transfers between regions this results in severe tax increases
or cuts in public spending in the small region.
Starting from this base scenario it is studied how fiscal transfers from the
large and technologically more advanced region to the small region affects per
capita consumption in both regions. Different variants of the policy, i.e. how
the money is spent, are compared and economic mechanisms underlying the
relative success of the policies are studied. We find that sharing the debt bur-
den of the periphery country has almost no effect on the growth dynamics of
that region. Fiscal transfers, our second policy, however, strengthen demand
and have a positive short and long run impact on per capita consumption
in the target region. Third, we find that technology oriented firm subsidies
have the strongest positive long run impact on per capita consumption of the
periphery country at which they are targeted and require a relatively small
union-wide budget. Finally, the effect of the technology policy on per capita
consumption can be leveraged if combined with transfers to households in
the lagging region, however, at the cost of a larger budget for the policies.
The model on which we base our analysis captures heterogeneity of firms
with respect to the quality of their physical capital and of workers with re-
spect to their specific skills. Specific skills of a worker increase over time
if her employer uses technology that is above the worker’s current specific
skills. Productivity of a firm is determined by a complementarity between
the (evolving) quality of its physical capital stock and the specific skills of its
workforce. Physical capital is available in different vintages and the firms’
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vintage choice when investing depends on a comparison of the firms expected
returns from different vintages. Due to this, diffusion of new vintages in a
technology is driven by the level of investment in physical capital undertaken
by firms, which depends on the demand dynamics, and the firms’ vintage
choice, which is strongly influenced by the specific skills in the firms’ work-
force. Our policy analysis rests on systematic simulation studies based on
large sets of batch runs under the different policy scenarios. Policy effects
are estimated using dynamic statistical models recurring to penalized spline
methods. Furthermore, the economic mechanisms driving the policy effects
are carefully analyzed employing time series of micro- and meso-level vari-
ables in the simulation data.
Our simulation model has been shown to reproduce a large set of empir-
ical stylized facts on different levels of aggregation. In this contribution and
different from previous policy analyses that we have conducted with the Eu-
race@Unibi model (see, e.g., Dawid et al., 2008, 2012a, 2014), we consider a
setting where the economy consists of a large region and a small region. The
average quality of the physical capital endowment and the specific skills are
initially substantially larger in the large region. Firms from different regions
globally compete on product markets but labor markets are assumed to be
local. Moreover, there is a home bias for the consumption good produced in
the region in which households live.
The policies of the simulation analysis are chosen to reflect recent Euro-
pean Union initiatives to get fiscal imbalances under control, and a public
policy debate that has brought forward various proposals to foster recovery
and the catch-up of lagging regions.
First, under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) put into place
in 2012 as a follow up to the temporary funding programs of the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation
Mechanism, member states can apply for funds when they are in financial
difficulties.1 Bailouts are conditional on accompanying reform programs for
fiscal consolidation, and members states having signed the European Fiscal
Compact, a stricter version of the European Growth and Stability Pact trying
to avoid excessive fiscal deficits of European Union member states.
Second, in the wake of the financial crisis one could observe a revival in
the interest of the effects of activist fiscal policies (Auerbach et al., 2010).
As part of this development, the policy initiatives by the European mem-
bers states and the European Commission to get hold of the financial crisis
have been accompanied by an academic discussion to which extent austerity
programs have expansionary or contractionary effects on output (see, e.g.
Alesina and Ardagna, 2010; Jordà and Taylor, 2016). Center stage to those
discussions is generally the multiplier effect of fiscal policies. It, however,
turns out that, empirically it is hard to narrow down the actual size of the
1See http://www.esm.europa.eu/ for more details on the ESM.
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fiscal multiplier. Using 104 studies on multipliers in a meta-study Gechert
(2015) concludes that the multipliers from public spending are significantly
positive and on average close to one. Yet, they vary considerably with the
study design and the type of spending. While there is a large body of evi-
dence on the likely fiscal effects as the previous study suggests, it seems less
known how fiscal policies in an economic union characterized by consider-
able heterogeneities in terms of size and factor endowments of the regions
may help to foster economic catch-up in periphery countries, and how core
countries will be affected. The exemption is a recent contribution by Blan-
chard et al. (2016) who show that an increase in government spending in the
core countries of the European Union would have positive and substantial
spill-overs on the output of the periphery countries.
Finally, there have been calls for structural reform programs accompanied
by infrastructure and R&D investments (see, e.g., Ioannides and Pissarides,
2015) often labeled a new “Marshall Plan” for Europe.2 Larger parts of the so
called cohesion policies target investments and funds of the European Invest-
ment Bank could, furthermore, be channeled towards fostering investment
activity it is claimed.
It occurs to us that the consequences of the various policy proposals in
terms of how they can help to speed up the catching up process of lagging
regions is not so well studied. In particular, the longer run consequences of
fiscal policies in comparison when technology inducing investment impulses
are taken into account seem to be vaguely understood. Thus, we aim for a
model based analysis that may help to better understand the various eco-
nomic mechanisms and consequences unfolding from different fiscal policies.
To this end, we recur to an agent-based macroeconomic model.
In the last ten years a number of closed macroeconomic models using
an agent-based approach have been developed (see, e.g., Dosi et al., 2010;
Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Ashraf et al., 2011; Raberto et al., 2012) and several
of these have been used to examine different issues in economic policy design.
Close to the topic of our paper are, on the one hand, studies of the effects of
fiscal policy on growth and, one the other hand, papers exploring the dynamic
interaction between regions using an agent-based approach. Russo et al.
(2007) compare the effects of fiscal policies focusing on strengthening de-
mand or fostering technological change in a simple single-region agent-based
macroeconomic framework finding that only the latter has positive implica-
tions for growth. In the framework of the ’Keynes meeting Schumpeter’ class
of agent-based macroeconomic models Dosi et al. (2013) observe a positive
effect of expansionary fiscal policy, which is oriented towards strengthening
demand, for growth and, consistent with these insights, the authors find in
2See, e.g., the interview with Barry Eichengreen
at http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/
barry-eichengreen-zur-schuldenkrise-griechenland-braucht-einen-marshallplan/
12006770.html
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Dosi et al. (2015) that policies requiring fiscal cuts in case of high public
debts or deficits are detrimental for growth. Multi-regional policy analy-
ses using an agent-based approach have, for example, been carried out in
Dawid et al. (2012a) studying the effect of labor market integration policies
on the convergence of regions, and in Dawid et al. (2013, 2014) examining
the effectiveness of different instruments of cohesion policies for the conver-
gence of regions. Wolf et al. (2013) present a multi-regional agent-based
macroeconomic framework, which has been developed to address issues in
environmental and climate policy. In our contribution, and differing from
the existing literature in general and from previous applications of the Eu-
race@Unibi model for ex-ante policy evaluations, we consider a two-region
set-up with a large and small region in terms of population size.
The outline of the paper is such that we give a non-technical overview to
our simulation model in Section 2. In Section 3 we first describe the experi-
mental set-up and then report on our results. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Overall Structure
In a nutshell, the Eurace@Unibi model describes an economy with an invest-
ment and a consumption goods sector, and a labor, a financial, and a credit
market in a regional context. Capital good firms provide investment goods
of different vintages and productivities. Consumption good firms combine
capital and labor of varying degrees of general and specific skills to produce
a consumption good that households purchase. Households’ saved income
goes into the credit and financial markets through which it is channeled to
firms financing the production of goods.
A complete description of the model as well as a discussion of a Virtual
Appliance tool, which allows any researcher to run policy experiments using
Eurace@Unibi and to reproduce results in published papers, is provided in
Dawid et al. (2016). Due to space constraints here no full treatment of
the model is given. Rather, we describe only the main aspects of the model,
which are crucial for the understanding of the mechanisms driving the policy
results discussed below. The description of the model is to a large extend
identical to the ones given in Dawid et al. (2012a, 2013, 2014), since the
multi-regional setup used here is similar to that underlying those previous
analyses. However, the policy agenda of this paper is quite different from the
earlier contributions, which focus on the comparison of different variants of
cohesion policies. Furthermore, the consideration of the interaction between
regions of different size distinguishes this paper from the other studies also
from a modeling perspective. Related to this point, the representation of
consumer choices, incorporating a bias towards goods produced in the own
region, is different from versions of the model used in previous applications.
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Capital goods of different quality are provided by capital goods produc-
ers with infinite supply. The technological frontier (i.e. the quality of the
best currently available capital good) improves over time, where techno-
logical change is driven by a stochastic (innovation) process. Firms in the
consumption goods sector use capital goods combined with labor input to
produce consumption goods. The labor market is populated with workers
that acquire specific skills on the job, which they need to fully exploit the
technological advantages of the capital employed in the production process.
Every time when consumption goods producers invest in new capital goods
they decide which quality of capital goods to select, thereby determining the
speed by which new technologies spread in the economy. Consumption goods
are sold at local market platforms (called malls), where firms store and offer
their products and consumers come to buy goods at posted prices. Labor
market interaction is described by a simple multi-round search-and-matching
procedure where firms post vacancies, searching workers apply, firms make
offers and workers accept/reject. Wages of workers are determined, on the
one hand, by the expectation at the time of hiring the employer has about
the level of specific skills of the worker, and, on the other hand, by a base
wage variable. The base wage is driven by the (past) tightness of the labor
market and determines the overall level of wages paid by a particular em-
ployer. Banks collect deposits from households and firms and give credits
to firms. The interest that firms have to pay on the amount of their loan
depends on the financial situation of the firm, and the amount of the loan
might be restricted by the bank’s liquidity and risk exposure. There is a
financial market where shares of a single asset are traded, namely an index
bond containing all firms in the economy. The allocation of dividends to
households is, therefore, determined by the wealth of households in terms
of their stock of index bonds. The dividend paid by each share at a cer-
tain point in time is given by the sum of the dividends currently paid by all
firms. The central bank provides standing facilities for the banks at a given
base rate, pays interest on banks’ overnight deposits and might provide fiat
money to the government.
Firms that are not able to pay the financial commitments declare il-
liquidity. Furthermore, if the firm has negative net worth at the end of the
production cycle insolvency bankruptcy is declared. In both cases it goes
out of business, stops all productive activities, and all employees loose their
jobs. The firm writes off a fraction of its debt with all banks with which it
has a loan and stays idle for a certain period before it becomes active again.
The spatial extensions of the markets differ. The capital goods market
is global and, therefore, consumption good firms have access to the same
technologies. On the consumption goods market demand is determined lo-
cally in the sense that all consumers buy at the local mall located in their
region. Supply on this market is global because every consumption good
firm might sell its products in all regional markets of the economy. Labor
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markets are characterized by spatial frictions. It is assumed that workers
accept jobs only inside their own region. Finally, firms have access to all
banks in the economy, i.e. credit markets operate globally. Our setup re-
flects the consequences of the Single Market Programme of the EU which
aims at integrating the goods, services, and financial markets as well as the
empirical evidence indicating that labor mobility in Europe is still low.3
The choice of the decision rules in the Eurace@Unibi model is based on a
systematic attempt to incorporate rules that resemble empirically observable
behavior documented in the relevant literature. Concerning households, this
means, for example, that empirically identified saving rules are used. Fur-
thermore, purchasing choices are described using models from the Marketing
literature with strong empirical support. In particular, in several parts of
the model, decision makers are described by logit models. These models
are well suited to capture decisions where individuals try to maximize some
objective function which depends on some variables common to all decision
makers and are explicitly represented in the model, as well as on aspects
that are idiosyncratic to each decision maker and captured in the model by
a stochastic term. With respect to firm behavior we follow the ’Management
Science Approach’, which aims at implementing relatively simple decision
rules that match standard procedures of real world firms as described in the
corresponding management literature. A more extensive discussion of the
Management Science approach can be found in Dawid and Harting (2012).
Agent actions can be time-driven or event-based, where the former can
follow either subjective or objective time schedules. Furthermore, the eco-
nomic activities take place on a hierarchy of time-scales: yearly, monthly,
weekly and daily activities all take place following calendar-time or sub-
jective agent-time. Agents are activated asynchronously according to their
subjective time schedules that is anchored on an individual activation day.
These activation days are uniformly randomly distributed among the agents
at the start of the simulation, but may change endogenously (e.g., when a
household gets re-employed, its subjective month gets synchronized with the
activation day of its employer due to wage payments). This modeling ap-
proach is supposed to capture the decentralized and typically asynchronous
nature of decision making processes and activities of economic agents.
2.2 Agents, Markets, and Decisions
2.2.1 Output Decision and Production
Consumption goods producers need physical capital and labor for produc-
tion. A firm i has a capital stock Ki,t that is composed of different vintages
v with v = 1, ..., Vt, where Vt denotes the number of available vintages a time
3In 2010, only 2.8% of working-age European citizens lived in another EU member
state (European Commission, 2011).
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t. The accumulation of physical capital by a consumption goods producer
follows
Kvi,t+1 = (1− δ)Kvi,t + Ivi,t (1)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Ivi,t ≥ 0 is the gross investment in vintage
v.
The production technology in the consumption goods sector is repre-
sented by a Leontief type production function with complementarities be-
tween the qualities of the different vintages of the capital good and the
specific skill level of employees for using these vintages. Vintages are de-
ployed for production in descending order by using the best vintage first.
For each vintage the effective productivity is determined by the minimum of
its productivity and the average level of relevant specific skills of the workers.
Accordingly, output for a consumption goods producer i at time t is given
by
Qi,t =
Vt∑
v=1
min
[
Kvi,t,max
[
0, Li,t −
Vt∑
k=v+1
Kki,t
]]
·min [Av, Bi,t] , (2)
where Li,t is labor input, Av is the productivity of vintage v and Bi,t denotes
the average specific skill level in firms as explained in more detail in Section
2.2.3. The fact that the considered production function takes into account
the vintage structure of the capital stock and that firms select among differ-
ent available vintages enables us to capture the effect of workers’ skills on
the incentives of firms to invest into new technologies (see Section 2.2.4).
Once every month each firm determines the quantities to be produced
and delivered to each regional mall the firm is serving. Actual demand for
the product of a firm in a given mall and a given month is stochastic (see
below) and there are stock-out costs, because consumers intending to buy
the product of a firm move on to buy from a different producer in case the
firm’s stock at the mall is empty. Therefore, the firm faces a production
planning problem with stochastic demand and stock-out cost. The simplest
standard heuristic used in the corresponding Operations Management liter-
ature prescribes to generate an estimation of the distribution of demand and
then choose the planned stock level after delivery such that the (estimated)
stock-out probability during the following month equals a given parameter
value which is influenced by stock-out costs, inventory costs and risk attitude
of the firm (see, e.g., Silver et al., 1998). Firms in the Eurace@Unibi model
follow this simple heuristic, thereby generating a target production quantity
for the considered month. Based on the target production quantity the firm
determines the desired input quantities of physical capital and labor. Realiz-
ing this production plan might induce the need to buy new physical capital,
hire new labor or to obtain additional credit. The firm might be rationed on
the labor and credit market, in which case it adjusts its production quantity
downwards.
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2.2.2 Pricing Decision
Consumption goods producers set the price of their products once a year
which is consistent with empirical observations (see, e.g., Fabiani et al.,
2006). The pricing rule is inspired by the price setting described in Nagle
et al. (2011, ch.6), a standard volume on strategic pricing in the Managerial
literature. Firms seek for a profit-maximizing price taking into account the
trade-off between price, sales and costs.
To obtain an indication of the effect of price changes on sales the con-
sumption goods producers carry out simulated purchase surveys (see Nagle
et al., 2011, pp. 304). A representative sample of households is asked to com-
pare a firm’s product with the set of the currently available rival products for
a range of prices. Households’ answers are based on the same decision rules
they use for their real purchasing decisions. Based on the resulting demand
estimations and cost considerations firms choose the price which maximizes
their expected discounted profit stream over their planning horizons.4
2.2.3 Adjustment of Specific Skills of Workers
The productivity of a worker h is determined by an endogenously increasing
specific skill level bh,t. It is assumed that during the hiring process the
specific skills of job candidates cannot be observed by potential employers.
They become observable during the production process. Workers increase
the specific skills over time during production by a learning process. The
speed of learning depends on the average quality of the technology Ai,t used
by employer i:
bh,t+1 = bh,t + χ ·max[0, Ai,t − bh,t]. (3)
Here bh,t are the specific skills of worker h in period t and 0 < χ < 1 denotes
the speed of adjustment of specific skills.5
4We like to point out that the implementation of the firms’ demand estimation differs
from the standard Eurace@Unibi model, as described in Dawid et al. (2016), in order to
allow region-specific demand estimations of firms. Formally, following Harting (2015), it
is assumed that firms do not only estimate the impact of their price on demand but also
that of a second product property, namely the regional origin.
5In the general version of the model heterogeneity of the learning speed across indi-
viduals is captured and it is assumed that the speed of adjustment positively depends
on the level of general skills (see Dawid et al., 2016). In the context of the policy anal-
ysis in this paper we abstract from the explicit representation of the heterogeneity of
general skills, since empirical evidence (Eurostat Education and Training Data http:
//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/education-and-training/data/main-tables) suggests
that there are no systematic differences between EU core and periphery regions with
respect to formal education.
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2.2.4 Technological Change
The supply of the capital goods and the process of technological change is
modeled in a very simplified way. We recur to a single capital good pro-
ducer that offers different vintages of the capital good v = 1, ..., Vt that have
distinct productivities Av. Alternatively, our representation of the supply
of capital goods can be interpreted as a market with monopolistic competi-
tion structure, where each vintage is offered by a single firm, which uses the
pricing rule described below.
New vintages become available over time following a stochastic process.
To avoid spurious growth effects, due to stochastic differences in the dynam-
ics of the technological frontier between runs, we use identical realizations of
the stochastic process governing the emergence of new vintages in all runs.
To keep the description of this sector as simple as possible, no explicit
representation of the production process and of the needed input factors
is introduced. To account for the cost dynamics, it is assumed that the
main factor of production costs is the wage bill and, since wages increase on
average with the same rate as productivity grows (see Subsection 2.2.6), the
growth rate of productivity is used as a proxy for the increase in production
costs of the capital goods.
The pricing of the vintages pv,t is modeled as a combination of cost-based
pcostt and value-based prices pvaluev,t (see, e.g., Nagle et al., 2011):
pv,t = (1− λ)pcostt + λpvaluev,t . (4)
Due to our assumption above, pcostt increases with the average productivity
of the economy. For the value-based price component the average general
and specific skills in the economy are determined first. In a next step the
discounted productivities for each vintage are calculated for a firm that em-
ploys workers whose human capital is equal to the average of the economy.
The value-based part pvaluev,t is proportional to this estimated effective pro-
ductivity of the vintage. The motivation for this rule is that the capital
good producer tries to estimate the value of each vintage, in terms of effec-
tive productivity, for its average customer. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the capital good producer is able to deliver any demanded quantity of any
vintage.
The reason why we choose such a simplified representation of the capital
goods sector is our focus on the interaction of labor market and consumption
goods market dynamics. Therefore, we try to keep all other sectors as simple
as possible. Not explicitly modelling the hiring and firing decisions of the
capital goods producer has two main implications. First, there are no wage
payments from the capital goods producer to households. However, in order
to close the model, all revenues of the capital goods producer are channeled
back to the households through dividends on the index bonds. Second, the
capital goods producer is never rationed on its input markets, in particular
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on the labor market. The qualitative implication of explicitly capturing the
capital goods producer’s hiring process would be that in periods when labor
market tightness is high there would be a relatively high probability that
the capital goods producer is rationed on the labor market. Being rationed
the firm would not be able to deliver the full amount of capital goods that
is demanded by the consumption goods producers. This would slow down
the expansion of these consumption good producers relative to their plans.
Such a qualitative effect is already present in the model since consumption
good producers need to hire labor themselves whenever they want to expand
their production. Through this channel a tight labor market has already a
hampering effect on firms’ expansion and potential rationing of the capital
goods producer would not add a qualitatively different effect.
2.2.5 Investment and Vintage Choice
If consumption good producers have a target output level which cannot be
produced with their current capital stock, they acquire new capital. To
this end, a consumption goods firm has to choose from the set of available
vintages. For the decision in which vintage to invest the complementarity
between specific skills and technology plays an important role: due to the
inertia of the specific skill adaptation, the effective productivity of a vintage
with Av > Bi,t is initially below its quality. It converges to Av over time
as the specific skills of workers at the firm catch up to the quality of the
vintage. Therefore, the firm computes a discounted sum of estimated effec-
tive productivities over a fixed time horizon S. The specific skill evolution
is estimated for each time step within [t, t+ S] using (3), where the firm in-
serts its average specific skill values. A logit choice model based on the ratio
of the estimated effective productivity and price for each available vintage
determines which vintage is ordered.
Capital goods are produced on demand, and as consumption goods pro-
ducers may find it more suitable for their production plans not to employ
the latest vintages, the capital good producer keeps on delivering also older
vintages as the technology frontier grows. Note, that the way we model the
capital good producer it is a proxy for a more differentiated market with
different firms supplying different vintages. In this sense, we capture vertical
differentiation in the supply of capital goods. Having an elaborated vintage
supply is crucial for our contribution given that the dynamics of the model
unfold through the interaction of heterogeneous labor and capital as inputs
to competing consumption goods producers. In particular, our approach
allows to capture the effects of the skill endowment in a region on the vin-
tage choice of firms and therefore on local technological change, which is an
important mechanism in our analysis.
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2.2.6 Labor Market Interaction
If the current workforce of a firm is not sufficient to produce its target output,
the firm posts vacancies for production workers. The wage it offers has two
constituent parts. The first part is the market driven base wage wbasei,t . The
base wage is paid per unit of (expected) specific skills of the worker. If the
firm cannot fill its vacancies and the number of unfilled vacancies exceeds
some threshold v > 0 the firm raises the base wage offer by a fraction ϕ to
attract more workers, i.e.
wbasei,t+1 = (1 + ϕ)w
base
i,t . (5)
The second part of the wage offer is related to an applicant’s expected level of
specific skills. Since the specific skills represent the (maximal) productivity
of the employees the wage wi,t is higher for higher (expected) specific skills.
Because the general skill level of a job applicants is not observable firms use
the average specific skills of all their employees to estimate that skill level
and offer a wage of
wOi,t = w
base
i,t ×min[Ai,tB¯i,t−1] (6)
where B¯i,t−1 are the average specific skills of all employees in the firm. A
firm can observe the specific skill levels of all its current employees, however
this information will not be transferred to a competitor in case a worker
applies there. The wage setting rule used is a reduced form representation of
the outcome of firm-level wage negotiations taking into account workers’ ex-
pected productivity in the firm as well as workers’ outside option. While one
might think of other models of wage setting and hiring models, it is crucial
for our analysis to capture the link between workers’ wages and their pro-
ductivity in the employer firm as well as the effect of labor market tightness
on wages. Both aspects are captured in a parsimonious way in the current
set-up .
An unemployed worker considers the wage offers posted by a random
sample of searching firms in the worker’s region and compares them with her
reservation wage wRh,t. A worker h only applies to firm i if it makes a wage
offer wOi,t > w
R
h,t.
The level of the reservation wage is determined by the current wage if the
worker is employed, and in case of an unemployed worker by her previous
wage, where the reservation wage declines with the duration of unemploy-
ment. The reservation wage never falls below the level of unemployment
benefits. If the unemployed worker receives one or more job offers she ac-
cepts the job offer with the highest wage offer. In case she does not receive
any job offers she remains unemployed.
In case the workforce of a firm is too large relative to its target output
level, the firm adjusts its number of workers. The set of dismissed workers is
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random. Additionally, there is a small probability for each worker-employee
match to be separated in each period. This should capture job separations
due to reasons not explicitly modeled.
2.2.7 Consumption Goods Market Interaction
The consumption goods market is modeled as a decentralized goods market.
Each local market is represented by a mall at which the consumption goods
producers can offer and sell their products to their customers. While firms
are free to serve all malls regardless their spatial proximity, households always
choose the mall which is located in their region.
Households go shopping once a week and try to spend their entire weekly
consumption budget for one good. The consumption budget is determined
using a (piecewise) linear consumption rule according to the buffer-stock
approach (see Carroll, 1997; Allen and Carroll, 2001). At the beginning
of their shopping procedure they get information about the prices of all
available goods at the mall, but they get no information about the available
quantities. The decision which good to buy is described using a logit-choice
model with strong empirical foundation in the Marketing literature (see,
e.g., Malhotra, 1984). We assume two factors influencing the consumers
choice function. These two parameters govern on the one hand the price
sensitivity of consumers and therefore the intensity of competition between
the consumption good producers, and the relative preference of households
for goods produced in their home region as opposed to the foreign region.
The latter is intended to foster the reproduction of stylized facts concerning
the fraction of local consumption and can be seen as a representation of
differences in taste. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence suggesting a
home bias in consumers choice, at least for developed countries, which can
be explained by the concept of consumer ethnocentrism (see, e.g., Balabanis
and Diamantopoulos, 2004; Watson and Wright, 2000). The term consumer
ethnocentrism has been introduced by Shimp and Sharma (1987) to represent
the responsibility and morality of purchasing foreign-made products and the
loyalty of consumers to products manufactured in their home country.6
The consumption requests for the different goods are collected by the mall
and, if the total demand for one good exceeds its mall inventory level then the
mall has to ration the demand. In this case the mall sets a rationing quota
corresponding to the percentage of the total demand that can be satisfied
6The French, German and Italian market for new cars in 2015 can serve as an example
that illustrates the concept of a home bias. While French car manufacturers such as
Renault, Citroen and Peugeot achieve a total market share of 56% in their domestic
market, German brands such as VW, Mercedes, Audi and BMW dominate the German
market for new cars with a total market share of more than 60%. The Italian market is
more open to foreign brands but the local producer Fiat is the undisputed market leader
with a market share of about 20%.
13
with the available goods. Each household receives the indicated percentage
of the requested consumption good.
After the shopping activity, rationed households may still have parts of
their consumption budget available. Those households have the opportunity
to spend the remaining budget for another good in a second shopping loop.
In this case the shopping process is repeated as described above.
The production of the consumption goods firm follows a fixed time sched-
ule with fixed production and delivery dates. Even if the mall stock is com-
pletely sold out it can only be refilled at the fixed delivery date. Conse-
quently, all the demand that exceeds the expected value of the monthly sales
plus the additional buffer cannot be satisfied.
2.3 Government
In each region there is a local government. In the default setting of the model,
the regional governments only have redistributional functions by collecting
taxes and using the tax revenues to finance unemployment benefits. It is
assumed that the regional governments run a balanced budget. To do so,
they adjust the tax rates in a way that, retrospectively, the tax rates would
have balanced the government expenditures of a given period of length TG.
More precisely, suppose Gr,t−τ are the governmental expenditures in period
t− τ and Y Gr,t−τ is the tax base from the same period. Then we assume that
the tax rate in t is determined according to
taxr,t =
∑TG
τ=1Gr,t−τ∑TG
τ=1 Y
G
r,t−τ
. (7)
The tax base in t− τ is derived from the tax revenue TRr,t−τ of this period
by computing the following expression:
Y Gr,t−τ =
TRr,t−τ
taxr,t−τ
. (8)
In the policy analysis, we deviate from this default setting essentially
in two ways. First, in the baseline policy scenario, we allow one region to
temporarily relax the balanced budget rule in order to pay out debt-financed
household transfers in that region. Second, in the policy treatment scenarios,
we assume a political union of regions and consider different policies that are
financed by a union-wide budget supported by contributions from member
states.
2.4 Parametrization and Validation
In order to determine the values and ranges of parameters to be used in the
policy experiments we follow an approach that combines direct estimation
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Table 1: Initialization of capital stock, skills, and size of regions
Region 1 Region 2
Initial quality of capital stock 1.5 1.0
Initial specific skills 1.5 1.0
Number of households/firms 4000/200 800/40
of parameters for which empirical observations are available with an indirect
calibration approach. This is done in order to establish confidence in the
ability of the model to capture economic mechanisms which are relevant for
real world economic dynamics. Standard constellations have been identified,
where values of parameters are chosen to reflect empirical evidence whenever
possible and where a large set of stylized facts can be reproduced. Further-
more, the fact that the development of the Eurace@Unibi model follows as
far as possible the Management Science approach, briefly discussed above,
provides empirical grounding to individual decision rules, thereby addressing
the important point of empirical micro-foundations for modeled behavior.
The set of macroeconomic stylized facts that have been reproduced by
the standard constellations of the Eurace@Unibi model includes persistent
growth, low positive inflation and a number of important business cycle
properties: persistent fluctuations of output; pro-cyclical movement of em-
ployment, consumption and investment, where relative sizes of amplitudes
qualitatively match those reported e.g. in Stock and Watson (1999), counter-
cyclical movement of wages and firm mark-ups. On the industry level the
model generates persistent heterogeneity in firm-size, profit rates, produc-
tivity and prices in accordance with empirical observations reported e.g. in
Dosi et al. (1997). Also labor market regularities, like the Beveridge curve,
are reproduced by the model with benchmark parameter constellations. The
reader is referred to Dawid et al. (2012b) for a more detailed discussion of
this issue. Tables with the list of parameter values used in the simulations
underlying this paper are provided in the Appendix.
3 Policy Analysis
3.1 Experimental Set-up
For the policy analyses we consider a parametrization of the model with a
large more advanced region and a smaller and economically less developed
region. In particular, the ratio of firms and households is five to one. More-
over, firms in Region 1 have a 50% higher initial average physical capital and
workers an equivalently higher initial level of specific skills.
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We contrast a baseline scenario with four different policies that poten-
tially combat regional economic divergence. The narrative for the baseline
scenario is that once real consumption goes below 50% of that of Region 1,
Region 2 starts a debt-financed (from third regions) governmental transfer
program in order to increase the consumption budget of its households by
10%, and thereby at least partly equalizes the living standards in compari-
son with Region 1. Once the debt to gross domestic product ratio reaches
150% in Region 2, access to external financing is stopped. In absence of any
union-wide policy initiative the government in Region 2 has to terminate the
transfer program and increase taxes in order to repay the debt. Taxes are
raised to a level such that debt can be paid back within a projected period
of 20 years.
The baseline scenario of a government in Region 2 acting on its own is
contrasted with four different union-wide policies all financed jointly accord-
ing to the shares of the two regions with respect to the union-wide gross
domestic product:
1. Sharing debt repayments
2. Continuation of transfers to the households in Region 2 but financed
by the union instead of the government of Region 2 only
3. Subsidies to firms in Region 2 that spur firms’ technology choice
4. A combination of subsidies to firms and household transfers.
While admittedly rather stylized, these policies resemble some of the
most prominent proposals having been made or policies that have actually
been implemented within the framework of the cohesion funds or the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM). We consider a sharing rule for the debt
repayments and transfers that is proportional to the outputs of the regions.
For the technology policy we introduce a subsidy for investments of firms
in Region 2. The intention of the policy is to subsidize investments only if
they are made at the technological frontier. We also want to capture in the
model, however, that it is often impossible for the policymaker to determine
whether a certain firm investment is indeed at the frontier. Therefore, we
assume that with probability (1 − α) an investing firm receives the subsidy
regardless of its vintage choice, whereas with probability α the subsidy is
obtained only if the firm chooses to invest at the frontier. For simplicity it is
assumed that the firm knows whether it will be able to receive the subsidy
regardless of the chosen vintage when it makes its vintage choices decision.
The subsidy covers 25% of the expenses of the firm for the purchase of the
new physical capital. For the experiment we set α = 33%.
For each of the considered policies 24 runs are conducted, with each run
encompassing 600 months. In order to avoid any transient effect that might
distort our policy analysis, we use an already settled state of the economy
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Figure 1: Panel a: per capita consumption in Region 1 (black) and Region 2
(red); panel b: productivity in Region 1 (black) and Region 2 (red).
as the actual start state of the simulations, where this state is the snapshot
of a pre-simulation at t = 1200.
In the following analysis, we evaluate the policies statistically by using
penalized spline regressions, a technique that can be applied to estimate
policy effects dynamically. For each policy scenario, we estimate a spline
function representing emerging dynamics of the policy in relation to the
baseline scenario, thereby capturing policy effects that evolve or vary over
time. A broader discussion regarding the application of spline regressions
in the context of estimating policy dynamics can be found in Dawid et al.
(2014).
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Baseline
We start the discussion of our results with Figure 1 which shows in panel (a)
consumption per capita and in panel (b) productivities for the Region 1
(black line) and Region 2 (red line). As time evolves the two regions diverge
in terms of both measures. Region 1 features an increase in per capita
consumption driven by a constant increase in productivity whereas Region 2
stagnates falling ever more behind Region 1 in relative terms.
Divergence of regions is based on essentially two driving mechanisms.
First of all, there is a size effect driving the pricing of capital goods. For
a non-perishable and tradable investment good there cannot be price dis-
crimination between firms located in Regions 1 and 2. The investment good
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Figure 2: Relative consumption in Region 2 without households transfers
(black) and with household transfers (red).
producer sets uniform prices for a global market taking into account the
value added that an investment good of a better vintage would have for
the consumption goods producer. The evaluation of the value added rests
on estimates of productivity increases that the consumption good producer
would be able to reap if it bought the latest technology. The technologically
advanced investment good only fully unfolds its productivity increases if it
is run by workers who have the adequate specific skills. Therefore, firms in
Region 2 would profit relatively less from purchasing the so priced capital
goods given that their workforce has a lower specific skill level. This sets, and
that is the second main force behind divergence, into effect a development
where firms in Region 2 do not purchase investment goods of higher quality
and eventually the productivity gap of Region 2 to Region 1 increases due to
this path dependency that, initially, was sparked by a lower level of specific
skills and technology in Region 2.
In the baseline policy scenario, when Region 2 falls behind Region 1 by
50% in terms of per capita consumption, a debt financed transfer program
to lift household consumption is started. Figure 2 compares the relative per
capita consumption levels of Region 2 to Region 1 with and without the
transfer policy. As to be expected relative per capita consumption increases
with the launch of the policy (red line). The government is able to relatively
improve the living conditions of households in Region 2 whereas it is not able
to reverse divergence of per capita consumption between the two regions.
As already explained in the previous section, we impose an upper ceiling
on debt financing of the government in Region 2. It cannot attract external
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financing of the transfer policy anymore when government debt reaches 150%
of output. This happens at about month 280. When the debt ceiling is
reached, the government ceases the transfer program and increase taxes in
order to repay the debt. Consequently, per capita consumption in Region 2
decreases and, relatively speaking, falls even below the level it would have
had without the transfer program installed in the first place. Hence, a policy
of fiscal expansion followed by austerity in Region 2 has negative implications
for per capita consumption in the long run.
3.2.2 Policy Effects
Now, let us turn to the four union financed policies outlined earlier on and
contrast them to the policy that was debt financed by the government of
Region 2 only. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 show the per capita consump-
tion levels of the two regions for the four policies and the baseline scenario.
The black and red line, as in the previous graph, are the baseline scenarios
with and without policy intervention by the government of Region 2. Had
the government in Region 1 been involved in repaying debts of Region 2
(green line), the slump caused by the tax increase of Region 2 to finance the
repaying of debts would not have occurred. Moreover, Region 1, as panel (a)
indicates, would have hardly been affected in terms of its per capita income.
But apart from the less dismal performance of Region 2 no longer run gains
accrue from a debt sharing policy for the lagging region. In fact, per capita
consumption is the same as in the scenario without any policy intervention
(black line). Quite the contrary, running the second policy with fiscal trans-
fers being paid to the households in Region 2 commonly financed by both
regions of the union (light blue line) does better than all policies studied
so far. Higher per capita consumption can be sustained beyond the times
where per capita consumption with debt sharing had already decreased to
the no-policy-intervention level. There also occur some gains of that policy
for Region 1. Thirdly, subsidies paid to the firms in Region 2 to incentivize
them to invest into better technology commonly financed by both regions,
lead to per capita consumption levels which are initially lower than with fis-
cal transfer policies but are paying out in the longer run (blue line). Again,
Region 1 seems to slightly profit from this policy. Finally, combining trans-
fers to households and subsidies to firms’ capital investment goods purchases
is achieving the largest gains in terms of per capita consumption.
In order to elicit the comparative policy effects in terms of their quan-
titative size and statistical significance we plot in Figure 4 per capita con-
sumption levels using splines. The time series have to be read as the absolute
effect on per capita consumption of the four policies in relation to Region 2
repaying its debts out of its own pockets. All policies have small negative
effects on per-capita consumption in Region 1. By the end of the simulation
period Region 1 has a per capita income of six units, and the most detri-
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Figure 3: Per capita consumption in Region 1 (panel a) and Region 2 (panel
b) under different policy treatments. Color code: black – no policy, red –
household transfer, light blue – household transfer by union, green – joined
debt repayment by union, blue – technology policy, magenta – combination
of household transfer and technology policy
mental policy would decrease per capita consumption in Region 1 by about
0.06 units, i.e. one percent. For Region 2 all policies have a sizable and
statistically significant positive effect on per capita consumption. Moreover,
as already hinted to by the previous graph some policies perform signifi-
cantly better than others. Sharing the debt burden helps Region 2 only
slightly during the repayment period but has no longer term effects on per
capita consumption (green line). As already indicated, paying subsidies to
incentivize investments in capital goods has longer run advantages. What
performs best is the combination of the subsidy with a joined financing of
household transfers. Here, the policy effects is about 0.5 units compared to
per capita consumption of less than two by the end of the simulation period
had Region 2 been left alone paying back its debts.
Contrasting the effect of the policies on output as shown in Figure 5 with
the effects on consumption reveals that the transfer policy, while having de-
creased consumption in Region 1, has a positive effect on output in that
region. Moreover, for Region 2 there is no output effect while it increases
consumption. For the policy incentivizing technology adoption, consump-
tion and output effects are both positive in Region 2, and both negative in
Region 1.
What stands behind those findings? The reason why subsidies to firms
in Region 2 to incentivize them to purchase higher vintage investment goods
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Figure 4: Spline smoothed policy effects of different policy treatments on per
capita consumption in Region 1 (panel a) and Region 2 (panel b). Color code:
light blue – household transfer by union, green – joined debt repayment by
union, blue – technology policy, magenta – combination of household transfer
and technology policy
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Figure 5: Spline smoothed policy effects of different policy treatments on
total output produced in Region 1 (panel a) and Region 2 (panel b). Color
code: light blue – household transfer by union, green – joined debt repayment
by union, blue – technology policy, magenta – combination of household
transfer and technology policy.
does so well is rather straightforward and illustrated in Figures 6 to 7. Those
subsidies actually achieve the goal of equipping firms in Region 2 with better
technology. This makes them more productive and improves their relative
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Figure 6: Spline smoothed policy effects of different policy treatments on the
average productivity in Region 1 (panel a) and Region 2 (panel b). Color
code: light blue – household transfer by union, green – joined debt repayment
by union, blue – technology policy, magenta – combination of household
transfer and technology policy.
competitiveness with respect to firms located in Region 1. Consequently,
their exports boost, generating more demand for firms in Region 2, which
spurs further investments and productivity increases. Household transfers
jointly financed by both regions essentially have no effect on productivity in
Region 2, although they raise demand to firms located in Region 2 which
makes those firms invest more. However, there is a countervailing effect ren-
dering this policy less effective than the technology policy for Region 2. As
firms in Region 2 are trying to meet the higher demand for their product by
expanding production they are decelerated by frictions in the labor market.
As they are hiring more workers wage demands increase which eventually
translate into the prices of the products produced by firms located in Re-
gion 2. It lowers their competitiveness relative to firms in Region 1, and
a share of the policy induced higher demand is met by firms producing in
Region 1. This can be seen by the decline of exports of Region 2 to Region 1
in Figure 7 for the transfer policy. As some of the production is transferred
to Region 1 by that policy there is no positive effect on the technology choice
in Region 2 although one could initially observe an expansion of the capital
stock. In addition, there is a very small positive effect on the technology
choice in Region 1 so that the technology gap is even slightly increasing
between the two regions for that policy scenario.
The effects of the technology policy differ from those of the transfer pol-
icy, as the pressure on prices, that originates from the frictions on the labor
market under the transfer policy, is alleviated. This is due to the fact that
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Figure 7: Spline smoothed policy effects of different policy treatments on
the average price of firms in Region 1 relative to the average price of firms
in Region 2 (panel a) and the export volume from Region 2 to Region 1.
Color code: light blue – household transfer by union, green – joined debt
repayment by union, blue – technology policy, magenta – combination of
household transfer and technology policy.
productivity of firms in Region 2 is positively influenced under the technol-
ogy policy. Under this policy firms in Region 2 become more competitive
eventually so that they achieve to increase exports to Region 1, thereby not
only increasing consumption but also output. The higher competitiveness
of firms in Region 2 harms Region 1 in terms of lowering its output in the
longer run.
As household transfers are combined with the technology policy, the neg-
ative effect of the demand policy on the competitiveness explained above is
strongly reduced, see panel (b) of Figure 6. Contrary to the isolated appli-
cation, the transfer policy when combined with the technology policy has a
strictly positive effect on productivity in Region 2 even slightly increasing
the effect of the technology policy. As firms in Region 2 become more com-
petitive in the longer run output shifts away from Region 1 which reduces
investments there, and eventually the quality of the capital stock in Region 1.
Finally, in contrast, the debt sharing policy does neither improve technol-
ogy adoption in Region 2 nor has a significant effect on household consump-
tion, none of the above outlined mechanisms unfolds rendering it ineffective
in terms of raising (relative) living standards.
As a final remark, we turn attention to the fiscal burden of the policies.
Figure 8 compares the expenditures for the policies. If fiscal transfers to
households in Region 2 are commonly financed, this uses up considerable
larger resources than paying out subsidies to spark investment into higher
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Figure 8: Volume of the policies: blue – tech policy, light blue – household
transfer, magenta – technology plus household transfer
quality technology of firms in Region 2.
4 Conclusions
In the aftermath of the financial and fiscal crisis we have been observing a
further economic disintegration in the European Union. Countries in the
periphery have been lacking the growth rates to keep up with the economic
development of the core countries. Per capita income differentials rather
increased than narrowed as a consequence. The disappointing economic per-
formance has also caused concerns about the stability, economically and po-
litically, of the European Union. Various proposals have been entering the
policy discussion. These range from unionizing debt repayments to transfers
to periphery countries either in terms of increasing households’ disposable
incomes or incentivizing investments to increase firms’ productivities. It
occurs that there is hardly any model based analysis that would try to eval-
uated ex-ante the likely consequences of these various policy proposals on
economic outcomes in the core and periphery countries for the medium as
well as longer run.
We adapted the Eurace@Unibi model that has been used for ex-ante pol-
icy evaluations in various other contexts to take into account the divergent
economic sizes and productivities in a stylized core-periphery setting. Start-
ing from a baseline scenario with a highly indebted periphery, we compare
four distinct policies in terms of the medium and long-run consequences for
output and consumption in the core and periphery. We find that a success-
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ful policy needs to target technology adoption, in our case by incentivizing
firms to purchase investment goods of higher quality. Only by doing so,
labor productivity can be eventually increased leading to higher per capita
consumption in the longer run. Compared to the other simulated policies,
a technology oriented policy also seems to be less resource intensive than
sharing debt repayments or transfers to households increasing their net in-
come. Fostering technology adoption in the periphery has negative effects on
output and consumption in the core. Those occur to be, however, relatively
small compared to the gains that could be achieved in terms of convergence
of economic conditions in our simulated setting of an economic union.
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Appendix
Simulation Parameters
The following table gives the default parameter setting used in the policy
experiments discussed in the paper.
Table 2: Values of selected parameters.
Parameter Description Value
u Wage replacement rate 0.70
TG Government time horizon in months 72
δ Capital depreciation rate (monthly) 0.01
γC Intensity of consumer choice: price 16.0
γL Intensity of consumer choice: home bias 4.0
ρ Discount rate (monthly) 0.005
S Firm time horizon in months 12
λ Bargaining power of the capital goods producer 0.5
ϕ Wage update 0.005
v Number of unfilled vacancies triggering wage update 2
ψ Wage reservation update 0.01
χ Specific skills adaptation speed 0.03703
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